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CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CARBON-BASED LIFE FORMS 
Steven Ferrey* 
Abstract: Corporations are being monitored as to their carbon base. The 
level of carbon in the atmosphere is reaching dangerous levels that 
threaten corporate productivity, as well as human health. Remember that 
humans are carbon-based life forms. This Article discusses in detail efforts 
to halt the release of carbon into the atmosphere and mitigate global 
warming, from state-led initiatives to litigation in lower courts and the 
U.S. Supreme Court. It concludes that incentivizing corporations to 
adopt renewable energy practices is the best way to address corporate citi-
zenship and environmental responsibility. 
Introduction 
 As carbon-based life forms, we as humans have become fixated on 
the carbon dioxide (CO2) that we exhaust in our modern industrial 
arc. This self-awareness and collective consciousness about the carbon 
contrail that we create is certainly the first step to effective, environ-
mentally responsible action on global warming. The environmentally 
aware corporate citizen must now comprehend the geopolitical reality 
of the corporate carbon footprint. 
I. A Shift in Environmental Values and Focus 
A. A New Vernacular 
 The millennial environmental vernacular is shifted forever. Phrases 
such as carbon footprint, offsets or carbon credits, and carbon neutral 
are commonplace. Global warming has enveloped the corporate and 
collective conscience.1 It is, and will remain, a meta-environmental met-
ric, crowding out a host of other environmental issues regarding how 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2008, Steven Ferrey, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; Visiting Pro-
fessor of Law, Harvard Law School, 2003. The author advises the United Nations and the 
World Bank on international energy and environmental issues related to global warming 
around the world. He is the author of six books and more than seventy-five articles on 
environmental and energy topics. 
1 See David J. Lynch, Corporate America Warms to Fight Against Global Warming, USA To-
day, May 31, 2006, at 1B; Press Release, Conference Bd., ‘Carbon Footprint’ Gaining Busi-
ness Attention (Oct. 18, 2006), http://www.greenbiz.com/news/news_third.cfm?NewsID= 
34145&CFID=5914114&CFTOKEN=36024781. 
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corporations are measured.2 According to David Crane, CEO of NRG 
Energy, “[T]his is the defining business issue of our generation.”3 
 How far we have come in just three years! I can bear witness to 
the quantum leap of the carbon issue into corporate consciousness. 
Three years ago, I was asked to participate in a symposium at William 
and Mary School of Law on a similar topic of the greening of Ameri-
can corporate environmental responsibility.4 It was an excellent as-
sembly of some wonderful academics and other speakers from around 
the United States. Amid the various topics discussed, however, only 
one dealt with energy, let alone carbon.5 
 In less than three years, the dialogue in which corporate Amer-
ica—really America as a whole—is engaged, has been significantly 
transformed. Certainly, the grandeur of the global warming issue is an 
appropriate focus in the twenty-first century because of both the im-
mediacy of the possibly irreversible damage that is inflicted by green-
house gas (GHG) emissions and a warming planet,6 and the collective 
nature of our dilemma. On the issue of the immediacy, James Hansen, 
head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
climate office, and one of the most prominently regarded world clima-
tologists, has announced that we have fewer than eight years to radically 
diminish carbon emissions or face a very different planet.7 
 During the twentieth century, the global average surface tempera-
ture increased by six-tenths of a degree Celsius, and the twentieth cen-
                                                                                                                      
2 See Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Polls Show Voters Around the Country 
Strongly Support Measures to Reduce Global Warming ( July 16, 2007), http://www.nrdc. 
org/media/2007/070716.asp. 
3 John Donnelly, Unlikely Allies Advance Global Warming Policy, Boston Globe, Aug. 22, 
2007, at A2. 
4 See generally Symposium, Corporate Governance and Best Practices, 31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 1 (2006) (providing a collection of articles on the topics of corporate gov-
ernance and environmental stewardship). 
5 Steven Ferrey, Corporate Governance and Rational Energy Choices, 31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 113, 113 (2006) [hereinafter Ferrey, Corporate Governance]. Even then, to fit 
energy within what was thought of as a legitimate topic on corporate environmental respon-
sibility, I had to focus on the opportunities to utilize renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
not on the meta-issue of what was a corporate carbon footprint. While then I focused on the 
advantages of certain on-site distributed energy technologies that could make economic 
sense, while limiting limit fossil fuel use, now, three short years later, the dialogue is about the 
corporate carbon footprint. 
6 See Jonathan Rauch, Global Warming: The Convenient Truth, Atlantic.com, Mar. 13, 
2007, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200703u/nj_rauch_2007-03-13. 
7 See Bill McKibben, How to Close a Catastrophe, 53 N.Y. Rev. of Books 18, 19 (2006) 
(discussing climatologist James Hansen’s opinion that we only have until 2015 to reverse 
carbon emissions or face radically changing the planet). 
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tury was likely the northern hemisphere’s warmest in a thousand years.8 
By 2100, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
models project the average global surface temperature to warm any-
where from 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius.9 This rate of warming is higher 
than has occurred over the past 10,000 years.10 The IPCC concluded 
that it is very unlikely that such warming is natural in origin or the re-
sult of internal variability alone.11 
 Carbon will be the worldwide environmental currency of this cen-
tury, establishing a new metric by which corporate responsibility will be 
measured and accounted for during the lifetimes of everyone alive to-
day. Given the fickle nature of public opinion and the collectively short 
memory of the population, how can I be so sure? For three reasons: 
CO2’s persistence in the environment, measurability, and translatability. 
 Assuming that the scientific consensus holds, carbon will be a un-
yielding challenge for centuries.12 The scientific reality of GHGs indi-
cates that even if we eliminated all anthropogenic carbon emission to-
morrow, the problem would not only persist, but worsen progressively 
over the next few centuries. All forecasts of the U.S. Department of En-
ergy (DOE),13 the International Energy Agency,14 and independent 
forecasters project that GHG emissions will increase exponentially, not 
decrease, during the foreseeable future. 
 Figures 1 to 3 depict the scientific linkage between CO2 emissions, 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs over time, and global tempera-
ture increase. These relationships will drive carbon policy. 
                                                                                                                      
8 Alex Kirby, Twentieth Century “Warmest in 500 Years”, BBC News, Feb. 16, 2000, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/644859.stm. 
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Working Group II Contribution 
to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulner-
ability, at 140 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc-wg2.org [hereinafter Working Group II 
Report]. 
10 IPCC, Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Cli-
mate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, at 5 (2007), available at http://ipcc-wg1.ucar. 
edu/wg1/wg1-report.html [hereinafter Working Group I Report]. 
11 Id. at 10. 
12 See Steven Ferrey with Anil Cabraal, Renewable Power in Developing Coun-
tries: Winning the War on Global Warming 7–12 (2006) (discussing the scientific 
debate on global warming and why that debate should not cloud or obscure the policy 
choices that are pursued to deal with warming issues). 
13 See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, International Energy Outlook: 
2007, at 83 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2007).pdf. 
14 See Int’l Energy Agency [IEA], World Energy Outlook 2006, at 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2006SUM.pdf. 
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 The conclusion to be drawn from these three Figures is inescap-
able—even if we were to radically slash CO2 emissions immediately and 
forevermore by eighty percent, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
would continue to mount and temperature would continue to rise for 
centuries. In other words, there is no quick fix to the course we have 
inattentively set, but now must navigate. Even with the Kyoto Protocol15 
mandate to reduce CO2 and other efforts, annual worldwide CO2 emis-
sions are forecasted to increase, rather than decrease, for the foresee-
able future.16 
 The Kyoto Protocol’s targets for GHG reduction will not be 
achieved in the specified time frames. The DOE forecasts that a world-
wide carbon increase of 54% over 1990 levels could occur by 2015.17 
While GHGs in the United States since 1990 have increased more 
slowly than population growth or electric power production, in the 
twelve years after 1990, U.S. GHG emissions increased by 10.9%.18 De-
spite Kyoto, GHG emissions in industrialized European countries also 
are increasing.19 
 The second reason that carbon metrics will become the meta-
measure of corporate greenness and environmental accountability is the 
simple universality of the quantitative nature of carbon. Seven com-
pounds affect the process of climate change, and thus are classified as 
GHGs; most of them contain carbon. Four of these compounds are 
natural: (1) water vapor, which is not regulated; (2) CO2, released dur-
ing combustion; (3) nitrous oxide (N2O) or laughing gas, which mainly 
comes from animals; and (4) methane (CH4).20 Three other com-
pounds are synthesized by humans. One group consists of perfluorocar-
bons (PFCs), which are used in aluminum production, semiconductors, 
                                                                                                                      
15 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. 
16 Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, International Energy Outlook: 
2005, at 77 (2005), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/forecasting/0484(2005).pdf 
[hereinafter International Energy Outlook 2005]. 
17 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Global Warming, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,253, 10,266 (2001). 
18 Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in 
the United States 2002, at ix (2003), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ 
archive/gg03rpt/pdf/057302.pdf [hereinafter EIA 2002 GHG Emissions Report]. This 
difference is a result of increased deployment of renewable resources and cogeneration 
during this period, and greater energy efficiency in U.S. manufacturing, production, and 
delivery of services. 
19 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Greenhouse Gas Data 
2006, at 2 (2006), available at http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_ 
publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/ghg_booklet_06.pdf. 
20 National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), U.S. Department of Commerce, Green-
house Gases, Frequently Asked Questions, http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/gases. 
html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
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and manufacturing.21 Another is hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), associ-
ated with refrigerants and fire extinguisher products.22 The final com-
pound is sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), the most potent GHG, amounting to 
22,000 times the warming effect, molecule-for-molecule, of CO2.23 
 GHG emissions are increasing. Fossil fuel generation results in 
sixty-four percent of the total atmospheric CO2, and this amount has 
increased significantly since 1990.24 In addition, SF6, a gaseous dielec-
tric medium, has replaced PCBs in electric switchgear.25 While CO2 is 
not the primary problem in terms of total impact—water vapor has 
four times the total impact on global warming—it is emitted by the 
usual suspects of air-emissions regulation.26 In historical context, even 
when it became more cost-effective to regulate other entities or mobile 
sources,27 the predilection of federal and state regulators has been to 
continue to demand that the electric power sector achieve greater ni-
trogen oxide (NOx) and CO2 reductions.28 As a group, electric power 
generation is a major source of NOx and CO2.29 Notwithstanding this 
contribution, regulatory practice indicates that we have returned again 
and again to the same compounds for additional mitigation, while 
other sources had yet to be tapped for similar reductions.30 
                                                                                                                      
21 EIA 2002 GHG Emissions Report, supra note 18, at 68. 
22 Id. at 64. 
23 Comparison of Global Warming Potentials from the IPCC’s Second and Third As-
sessment Reports, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/archive/gg04rpt/global.html (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2008); ScienceDaily, Science Reference, Sulfur Hexafluoride, http://www. 
sciencedaily.com/articles/s/sulfur_hexafluoride.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
24 Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in 
the United States 2005: Executive Summary 2–3 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe. 
gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/summary/pdf/0573(2005)es.pdf; Frequently Asked Global Change 
Questions, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/faq.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
25 Basic Information, SF6 Emission Reduction Partnership for Electric Power Systems, 
US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/electricpower-sf6/basic.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) “are man-made organic chemicals known as chlorinated 
hydrocarbons.” Basic Information, Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), Wastes, US EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/pcb/pubs/about.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
26 See Ferrey with Cabraal, supra note 12, at 8; Arianne Appel, Global Warming Super-
charged by Water Vapor?, Nat’l Geographic News, Nov. 10, 2005, http://news.national 
geographic.com/news/2005/11/1110_051110_warming.html. 
27 J.R. Pegg, Changes to Clean Air Act Drifting Past the Public, Env’t News Service, Mar. 
28, 2003, http://www.ens-newswire.com (search “Changes to Clean Air Act Drifting Past 
the Public”). 
28 See 1 Steven Ferrey, Law of Independent Power § 6:90 (2007) (1989) [hereinafter 
Ferrey, Law of Independent Power] (discussing Alternative Control Techniques (ACTs) 
and Control Technique Guidelines (CTGs) that have been the focus of the electric utility 
sector for achievement of NOx reductions). 
29 Working Group I Report, supra note 10, at 259; Ferrey, Law of Independent 
Power, supra note 28, § 2:1. 
30 See Pegg, supra note 27. 
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 In the United States, electricity demand has continued to increase 
since 1990,31 and residential energy consumption is projected to in-
crease by roughly 17% from 1995 through 2015.32 Near-term energy 
generation facility capacity shortages are predicted in Texas, New York, 
California, and New England.33 More than 100 coal-fired power plants 
are currently being developed.34 According to Cambridge Energy Re-
search Associates, there are not enough new power plants planned over 
the next ten years to meet the projected demand.35 Over 70% of U.S. 
power generation is fired by fossil fuel, with more than 50% fired by 
coal.36 
 As previously stated, GHGs include those gases of most concern: 
CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFCs, and PFCs.37 The most prevalent GHG is wa-
ter vapor.38 It alone is the unregulated GHG. The global warming im-
pact, molecule-by-molecule, of many of these secondary and less preva-
lent GHGs is significantly greater than CO2.39 However, because they 
are released in much smaller quantities and/or have shorter residence 
times in the atmosphere before they dissipate, CO2 is the most trou-
bling GHG and, thus, where policy has been focused.40 The GHGs in 
Table 141 below are displayed in descending order of their impacts on 
the environment, which are a function of their quantity released, their 
heat radiation properties, and their residence time in the atmosphere. 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Annual Energy Review 2006, at 
226 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf. 
32 See Solar Energy International, Energy Facts, http://www.solarenergy.org/resources/ 
energyfacts.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
33 See, e.g., David Lazarus, Overload: Why the State Can’t Keep Up with the Demand for En-
ergy—Even in December, SFGate.com, Dec. 7, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article. 
cgi?file=/c/a/2000/12/07/MN150082.DTL&type=printable. 
34 See Erick Shuster, Nat’l Energy Tech. Lab., Tracking New Coal-Fired Power 
Plants 6 (2008), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/coal/refshelf/ncp.pdf. 
35 See Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), Press Coverage, Heat Wave, 
Natural Gas, and Oil: CERA in the News August 2006, http://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/ 
public1/news/pressCoverage/pressCoverageDetails.aspx?CID=8360 (last visited Apr. 30, 
2008). 
36 International Energy Outlook 2005, supra note 16, at 51; Energy Information Ad-
ministration, Overview—Electricity Generation, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
page/prim2/chapter3.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
37 See EIA 2002 GHG Emissions Report, supra note 18, at ix. In 2000, U.S. anthropo-
genic activities emitted 320 million tons of CH4 and thirty-three TgN of NOx into the at-
mosphere. These levels are rising at a rate of about four percent per year. See id. at 25. 
38 National Climatic Data Center, supra note 20. 
39 Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in 
the United States 1998, at 6–7 (1999), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/ 
environment/057398.pdf [hereinafter EIA 1998 GHG Emissions Report]. 
40 See id. 
41 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Sinks: 1990–1993, at ES-2 
(1994); Ferrey with Cabraal, supra note 13, at 9. 
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Table 1: Key Facts About GHGs 
GHG Global Warming 
Potential (CO2 = 1) 
Residency Time 
(years) 
Amount U.S. Total 
GHG Release (%) 
CO2 1 100 85 
CH4 21 12 11 
N20 310 120 2 
HFCs 140 to 11,700 varies < 1 
CFCs 6500 varies < 1 
SF6 23,900 varies < 1 
 
 CO2 is the main byproduct of fossil fuel combustion. Ninety-eight 
percent of U.S. anthropogenic CO2 emissions are from combustion of 
fossil fuels, and 83% of U.S. GHG emissions are attributed to CO2.42 
The sheer amount of CO2 emitted into the environment is enormous, 
and the gas persists for more than 100 years.43 In 2001, the world emit-
ted almost seven billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere.44 Global CO2 
emissions are rising at the rate of approximately 10% per year.45 At-
mospheric CO2 levels now are approximately 33% higher than in pre-
industrial times.46 Given this simple Table assigning relative value to 
CO2 and other GHGs, these units are poised to become the environ-
mental yardstick of twenty-first century basic corporate environmental 
accountability. 
 Finally, the issue of environmental carbon translates well for both 
public and media attention and accountability. Various nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) are pressing for mandatory carbon disclo-
sure.47 This translation is evidenced by the fact that, while five years ago 
corporate stockholder resolutions on carbon were a rarity, now an in-
creasing number of corporate shareholder resolutions involve envi-
                                                                                                                      
42 EIA 2002 GHG Emissions Report, supra note 18, at x; EIA 1998 GHG Emissions 
Report, supra note 39, at 13. 
43 See Global Warming Will Persist At Least a Century Even if Emissions Curbed Now, Science-
Daily, Feb. 18, 2002, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2002/02/020218094427.htm. 
44 Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, International Energy Outlook: 
2003, at 5 (2003), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/forecasting/0484(2003). 
pdf. 
45 New Global Analysis Shows 400 Percent Increase in Carbon Dioxide Emissions Growth, Phy-
sorg.com, Nov. 10, 2006, http://www.physorg.com/news82381987.html. 
46 Reitze, supra note 17, at 10,254. CO2 levels have increased from between 270 to 280 
parts per million (ppm) in pre-industrial times to more than 360 ppm in 1999. Id. NOx 
levels increased from 270 to 310 ppm, and CH4 concentrations have increased from 700 
parts per billion (ppb) to 1700 ppb over the same period. Id. 
47 See The Equator Principles, http://www.equator-principles.com (last visited Apr. 30, 
2008). The Equator Principles are a set of principles voluntarily adopted by financial insti-
tutions that set a “benchmark for the financial industry to manage social and environ-
mental issues in project financing.” Id. 
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ronmental issues, with a significant number of them involving global 
warming.48 
B. From Conventional to Global 
 The globalization of commerce is manifest. The modern mission 
of many U.S. corporations is to compete in global markets.49 Global 
warming impacts are the side effect to this globalization of commerce. 
This international focus is truly a paradigm shift, from environmental 
localism and immediacy, to environmental globalization and indirect 
impacts. Corporate environmental measurement is transformed by 
the ascendance of carbon as a form of measurement. As well, global 
carbon is becoming a meta-environmental metric, overreaching the 
media specifics of conventional environmental regulation. 
 Conventional environmental laws and regulations target pollutants 
that have immediate local and regional impacts. For example, the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),50 the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (Superfund),51 the Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act 
(TURA),52 the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA),53 and various water 
withdrawal statutes54 concern pollution that has a point source, and 
whose impact on citizens is a function of its direct proximity to the 
point of emission, pollutant release, or its migration. Indeed, U.S. envi-
ronmental statutes that address conventional pollutants are primarily 
dotted with local legal operative terms such as “point source,”55 local 
                                                                                                                      
48 U.S. Firms Face Global Warming Shareholder Resolutions, Entrepreneur.com, Apr. 1, 
2005, http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/130378479.html. 
49 See General Motors, Corporate Information—Company Profile, http://www.gm.com/ 
corporate/about/company.jsp (last visited Apr. 30, 2008); Home Depot, Our Company, 
Global Presence, http://corporate.homedepot.com/wps/portal/!ut/p/.cmd/cs/.ce/7_0_ 
A/.s/7_0_6CD/_s.7_0_A/7_0_6CD (last visited Apr. 30, 2008); Microsoft, Corporate Citizen-
ship, http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/us/default.mspx (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2008). 
50 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2000); 
see Steven Ferrey, Environmental Law: Examples & Explanations 285–332 (3d ed. 
2004) [hereinafter Ferrey, Examples & Explanations]. 
51 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000 & Supp. 2004); see Ferrey, Examples & Explanations, supra 
note 50, at 333–425. 
52 Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21I, §§ 1–23 (2006). 
53 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000 & Supp. 2004); see Ferrey, 
Examples & Explanations, supra note 50, 217–58. 
54 See, e.g., Massachusetts Water Management Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21G, §§ 1–19 
(2006). 
55 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2). 
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soil and water categories,56 designations of contiguous property owner 
status where one is not liable for migrated pollution,57 and “community 
response” and “community right-to-know” disclosure requirements.58 
The conventional environmental nomenclature is local, proximate, and 
earthbound, to reflect the immediate nature of the impact of conven-
tional point sources of emissions or soil and water pollution. 
 This very focused and proximate conception of environmental 
values and concern is manifest in the movements for environmental 
equity that became prominent in the 1990s.59 Even air pollution is a 
relatively local environmental concern. Despite recent data showing 
that conventional air pollutants are drifting from sources in Asia to 
California, and from sources in California to Massachusetts,60 conven-
tional criteria and toxic air pollutant impacts and regulation is still a 
local and regional issue.61 In Massachusetts and elsewhere, when new, 
large stationary sources seek required regulatory approvals, they must 
demonstrate a level of no significant health impact.62 Similarly, water 
withdrawal statutes and regulations,63 National Environmental Policy 
                                                                                                                      
56 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 2 (2006). 
57 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q) (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
58 See, e.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11001–11050 (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
59 See Ferrey, Examples & Explanations, supra note 50, at 19–20. I formed one of 
the very first environmental equity groups in the United States in 1977, when I formed a 
Chapter of Friends of the Earth in Oakland, California to work with the local community 
on concerns about local environmental impacts on low-income neighborhoods. 
60 See Traci Watson, Air Pollution from Other Countries Drifts into USA, USA Today, Mar. 
13, 2005, at 1A. 
61 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2000); Ferrey, Examples & Explana-
tions, supra note 50, at 163, 168. Air Quality Control Regions (AQCRs) are disaggregated 
into approximately 264 regions in the country, each of which is required to achieve mini-
mum federal levels of clean air, based on a half-dozen criteria pollution thresholds estab-
lished by the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3); Ferrey, Examples & Expla-
nations, supra note 50, at 163, 168; Arnold W. Reitze, Air Pollution Control Law: 
Compliance and Enforcement 357 (2001). 
62 See, e.g., 310 Mass. Code Regs. 7.01(1) (2005); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 164, 
§ 69J1/4 (2006). Air modeling requirements imposed in Massachusetts typically involve air 
modeling within a twenty kilometer radius of the new emission source. 310 Mass. Code 
Regs. pt. 7. Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Board requirements similarly look to 
local impact mitigation of air impacts resulting from a new power generating facility of 
greater than one hundred megawatts of capacity. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 164, § 69J1/4. 
63 See Water Management Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21G (2006); Ferrey, Examples & 
Explanations, supra note 50, at 259–83 (discussing rights to use water); Water Manage-
ment Act Permits, Superior Court Rules for Ipswich River, Denies Hamilton Claims in wa-
ter Case, http://www.crwa.org/releases/2007/hamilton.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
In 2007, a Massachusetts Superior Court granted the Ipswich Watershed Association relief 
with a mandamus action that required the state environmental agency to do safe yield 
analysis of local watersheds before granting water withdrawal permits for groundwater 
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Act of 1969 Environmental Impact Statement (NEPA EIS) impact 
analyses,64 and certainly all the local environmental authority and regu-
lations65—including the local conservation commission, local board of 
health, local planning board, local zoning board, the licensing author-
ity of the city counsel or town legislature, and the fire chief—are by 
their very scope and definition, concerned with relatively local envi-
ronmental impacts. 
 These elements of environmental protection are firmly established, 
alive and well. Yet, today, the common metaphor of the environmental 
challenge and responsibility for the twenty-first century is the global 
warming of Earth. For some, it was the polar bear isolated and adrift on 
a sheared ice flow on the cover of Time magazine that captured their 
attention.66 Even for the most focused jock, the picture of Dontrell 
Willis of the Florida Marlins, standing knee-deep in a flooded Dolphins 
Stadium,67 made the undeniable point that global climate change is 
more than a game. 
 For the current generation, the issue of global warming and 
planetary change resonates unlike any other environmental issue.68 It 
is not surprising then, that this year’s major cultural event was a Con-
cert for the Planet69 featuring performers on every continent, or that 
new charities, such as Computers Across Borders, have arisen to work 
with corporations on global warming mitigation.70 
                                                                                                                      
withdrawal on land exceeding certain limits, as required by the Massachusetts Water Man-
agement Act. Id. 
64 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2000 & 
Supp. 2004); Ferrey, Examples & Explanations, supra note 50, at 114–17 (discussing 
NEPA EIS analysis). 
65 See Ferrey, Examples & Explanations, supra note 50, at 427–66 (discussing local en-
vironmental controls). These local authorities with environmental or quasi-environmental 
authority are the major, under-appreciated environmental force in the constellation of envi-
ronmental controls. Id. 
66 Time, illus. cover, Apr. 3, 2006. 
67 Sports Illustrated, illus. cover, Mar. 12, 2007. 
68 See Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Polls Show Voters Around the Country 
Strongly Support Measures to Reduce Global Warming ( July 17, 2007), http://www.nrdc. 
org/media/2007/070716.asp. 
69 J. Freedom du Lac, Al Gore to Sound Off on Climate Change with Concert Event, Wash. 
Post, Feb. 15, 2007, at C1. 
70 Computers Across Borders, http://computersacrossborders.org/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2008). Computers Across Borders (CAB) is a charity, started by an Ameri-
can student, that provides used computer equipment donated by corporations to schools 
and libraries that are powered by renewable low-carbon energy sources. Id. In the pro-
gram’s first year in operation, 2006 to 2007, it donated computers to hydro-powered 
schools in Ecuador, wind-powered schools in India, and hydro-powered schools in Ghana, 
and is now seeking computers to donate to schools in New York City that can draw on re-
newable energy. Id. 
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 What are the future impacts of global warming? In 2007, the IPCC 
Summary Report found multiple particular impacts of global warming 
on water resources, food production, and ecosystem and human 
health.71 A predicted temperature rise of three degrees Celsius would 
leave up to thirty percent of species facing extinction, and would deci-
mate the marine coral population.72 Food production and crop yields 
would likely decrease in lower latitude areas, even if the global tem-
perature increase is small.73 Crop yields would likely increase in higher 
latitude areas, even if the temperature increase is between one and 
three degrees Celsius.74 Higher temperatures will increase the concen-
trations of ground-level ozone leading to the more rapid spread of in-
fectious diseases and cardiovascular disease.75 Competition for dwin-
dling water resources will be exacerbated.76 Forests will be increasingly 
affected by pests, disease, and fire, and there will be large increases in 
burned areas.77 Sea levels will rise, with more storm surges.78 
 What these predictions mean is more losses, and more litigation 
as a result. In the utility sector in particular, which is the source of 
about one-third of global warming gases,79 certain elements of these 
forecasts are especially noteworthy. Power plants are often located on 
the coasts for cooling water purposes,80 and the coasts are now ex-
periencing greater climate-related storm surges and rising sea level.81 
Low-lying coastal areas may not be the best places to site power plants. 
In addition, with rising temperature, the efficiency of electric power 
production and transmission declines. At higher temperatures, it re-
                                                                                                                      
71 Working Group II Report, supra note 9, at 35–41. 
72 Id. at 213. 
73 Id. at 275. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 393, 403, 418. Warm temperatures at ground-level can increase air and water 
pollution, thus increasing the risk to human health. Cimate.org, Impact of Climate 
Change on Human Health, http://www.climate.org/2002/topics/health/index.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
76 Working Group II Report, supra note 9, at 190–91. 
77 Id. at 228. 
78 Id. at 317. 
79 See EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, 1990–2006, at 
ES-7 to -9 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads/ 
08_CR.pdf. 
80 Ferrey, Law of Independent Power, supra note 28, §§ 2:2 to :4, 6:136 to :139; see 
Heal the Bay, Current Issues, Coastal Power Plants, http://www.healthebay.org/current 
issues/powerplants/default.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2008) (noting that a large number of 
California’s power plants are located on the coast to use ocean water for industrial cooling). 
81 Working Group II Report, supra note 9, at 317. 
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quires more fossil fuel to create a unit of energy,82 which increases the 
production of NOx,83 and transmission losses increase.84 Thus, rising 
temperatures will decrease the efficiency of the existing power gen-
eration and delivery system. 
II. Carbon Pressures on Corporations 
 The external environmental pressure on corporations originates 
from two sources. First, legislative and regulatory action pressures cor-
porate compliance and decisionmaking. As submitted below, this regu-
lation has not been particularly focused, coordinated, or effective. 
 Second, there has been a significant upturn in litigation involving 
carbon emissions, even before a recent U.S. Supreme Court case ele-
vated carbon to a significant litigation risk.85 The prospect and actuality 
of such litigation is changing the corporate landscape. 
A. Carbon Regulation 
 There are international and state regulatory regimes in place. How-
ever, these regimes will not solve the problem of global warming. GHGs, 
specifically CO2, have been identified by many leading scientists as a sig-
nificant cause of the increase in Earth’s temperature.86 The potential in-
crease already set in motion has been estimated in different scientific 
models to be up to eight degrees Celsius within forty years.87 In response, 
policies to monitor and restrain the emission of GHGs were adopted in 
the Kyoto Protocol, requiring participating countries to lower their emis-
sions by eight percent from 1990 levels.88 After 2012, when the Kyoto 
Protocol expires, the world community will need to establish additional 
                                                                                                                      
82 At lower temperatures, the heat rate, measured in amout of Btu energy, required to 
produde a kilowatt hour of electric power from a fossil fuel-fired generation unit de-
creases. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Non-Major Comprehensive Plan Appli-
cation Conditional Approval, Application No. MBR07COM006, at 2 ( Jan. 22, 2008) (de-
scribing a 545 million Btu per hour heat rate on natural gas fuel when firing at sixty-six 
degrees Fahrenheit or lower temperatures). 
83 Ferrey, Law of Independent Power, supra note 28, § 6:3. 
84 Id. § 10:78.1. 
85 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007). 
86 Joint Science Academies’ Statement: Global Response to Climate Change ( June 7, 
2005), http://royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=20742 (stating that “there is now 
strong evidence that significant global warming is occurring,” and that “[i]t is vital that all 
nations identify cost-effective steps that they can take now, to contribute to substantial and 
long-term reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions”). 
87 Wm. Robert Johnston, Global Warming, http://johnstonsarchive.net/environment/ 
wrjp365g.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
88 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 24. 
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controls on GHGs.89 President Bush formally withdrew the United States 
from participating in the Kyoto Protocol in 2001.90 
 Internationally, there are problems with the Kyoto Protocol.91 In 
brief, first, the costs of compliance are very high.92 Second, only one-
sixth of countries are covered by GHG-reduction strategies under the 
Protocol.93 Third, the Protocol has generated minimal benefits to 
date.94 Further, it offers zero possibility of reversing warming, even if 
fully implemented.95 In 2012, Kyoto ends and the world will have sig-
nificantly greater GHG emissions than when the Protocol was originally 
implemented. Rather than reducing the amount of GHG, as deigned, 
the amount will have increased significantly, not only in industrialized 
nations, but also in developing countries.96 Kyoto does not provide a 
long-term solution. Even though the United States did not implement 
the Kyoto Protocol after signing it,97 there is carbon regulation in the 
United States.98 
                                                                                                                      
89 Joseph Coleman, Report: Climate Change Affordable, ABC News, May 4, 2007, http:// 
abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=3140559. 
90 Margaret Kriz, Warm-up Drills, 37 Nat’l J. 906, 906 (2005). 
91 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Kyoto Protocol, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2878.php (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
The Kyoto Protocol created three flexible mechanisms. The first is the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), including projects in developing countries such as China and India and 
creating Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). Id. The second is Joint Implementation ( JI), 
including projects in developed countries such as Ukraine and Russia and creating Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs). Id. The third is Emissions Trading, including trading between 
countries and not to be confused with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme or 
other trading schemes. Id. 
92 See Robert N. Stavins, Professor of Bus. & Gov’t & Dir. of the Envtl. Econ. Program, 
Harvard Univ., Address at the Trilateral Commission’s 2006 North American Regional Meet-
ing (Oct. 22, 2006), http://www.trilateral.org/nagp/regmtgs/06pdf_folder/Stavins.pdf. The 
cost of compliance amounts to an estimated four times the cost of effective levels. Id. 
93 Press Release, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
UNFCCC Chief Sees Kyoto Protocol Countries on Their Way to Reach Emissions Targets 
(Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_ 
advisories/application/pdf/20060215_anniversary_kp_entry_into_force.pdf. Thirty-four of 
200 nations in the world are covered by the Kyoto Protocol. See id. 
94 Antonio Martino, Kyoto? Mamma Mia!, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 2005, at A16. 
95 See id. The 2012 Kyoto targets will not reduce total GHG emissions, even if they are 
met, which they will not be. 
96 See generally Ferrey with Cabraal, supra note 12 (addressing issues of global warm-
ing in developing countries). 
97 The Senate voted against the Kyoto Protocol ninety-five to zero, and no presidential 
candidate would have brought it back for another vote. The Senate adopted a nonbinding 
resolution in July 1997 urging the Clinton administration not to sign the Kyoto Protocol. 
Byrd-Hagel Resolution of 1997, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). The treaty was never sub-
mitted for Senate ratification. Moreover, under the structure of Kyoto, there would be no 
credit for U.S. reductions of GHGs. 
98 See discussion infra Part II.A.1–4. 
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1. Domestic Carbon Regulation 
 National voluntary programs exist. There have been voluntary na-
tional corporate carbon reporting regulations since 2006.99 These regu-
lations, however, require either reporting or registration of carbon, but 
do not provide a mechanism to reduce it. The Chicago Climate Ex-
change (CCX) operates a voluntary, legally binding reduction and trade 
program for corporations that wish to participate.100 Phase I, spanning 
2003 to 2006, calls for a 4% reduction from the 1998 to 2001 baseline.101 
Phase II, 2007 to 2010, calls for an additional 2% reduction for Phase I 
members.102 Carbon Financial Instruments (CFIs), which are futures 
contracts, are surrendered to meet a reduction requirement.103 
2. The Sun Rises in the East 
 There is also action at the state level. As U.S. carbon market initia-
tives go, however, East does not meet West. On the East Coast, to fill the 
vacuum left by the United States’s refusal to participate in the Kyoto 
Protocol, states have taken direct regulatory action.104 On December 
20, 2005, seven northeastern states—since increased to ten105—entered 
into an agreement to implement the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
                                                                                                                      
99 See Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 13385(b) (2000). 
100 See Chicago Climate Exchange, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited Apr. 
30, 2008). 
101 Chicago Climate Exchange, Key Features, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/con- 
tent.jsf?id=25 (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. These CFIs are analogous to European Union Emissions Trading Scheme alloca-
tions. See Press Release, McMillian Binch Mendelsohn, Emissions Trading and Climate 
Change Bulletin ( July 2007), http://www.mcmbm.com/upload/publication/Emissions 
Trading_EU_0707.pdf. 
104 For example, prior to joining any formal agreement, Massachusetts had enacted its 
own regulations to reduce CO2 emissions. 310 Mass. Code Regs. 7.29 (2007). 
105 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): The Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/rggi (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2008). Massachusetts and Rhode Island were given the status of observing states, 
and both have since joined the RGGI agreement. Press Release, Executive Dep’t, Com-
monwealth of Mass., Governor Patrick Signs Regional Pact to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions ( Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=pressreleases&agId=Agov3&pr 
ModName=gov3pressrelease&prFile=reduce_greenhouse_gases011807.xml. Maryland, a 
predominantly coal-powered electricity generation state in contrast to the other RGGI 
states, also subsequently joined RGGI in 2006. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov-
ernor Martin O’Malley Signs Greenhouse Gas Agreement, Climate Change Executive Or-
der (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.gov.state.md.us/pressreleases/070420.html. 
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tive (RGGI).106 The principal goal of the Memorandum of Understand-
ing (MOU) signed by the states was to: 
[C]reate a CO2 Budget Trading Program aimed at stabilizing 
and then reducing CO2 emissions within the Signatory States, 
and implementing a regional budget and allowance trading 
program that will regulate CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel fired 
electricity generating units having a rated capacity equal to or 
greater than 25 megawatts.107 
 The market-based design of the RGGI MOU is a cap-and-trade pro-
gram. “Cap-and-trade systems operate by capping the amount of CO2 
emissions allowed, distributing CO2 emissions allowances to sources up 
to the cap, and requiring each covered source to have sufficient allow-
ances to cover its CO2 emissions at the end of each compliance pe-
riod.”108 This technique is a supply-side, point-of-generation initiative: 
“CO2 emission allowances will be allocated to, and traded among, fossil 
fuel-fired electricity generators within the region that supply electricity 
to the grid.”109 
 The Draft Model Rule, finalized in January 2007 after more than 
two years of work by the RGGI Staff Working Group, is the foundation 
upon which the various RGGI states will base their individual rules. 
One significant aspect of the RGGI model rule is its requirement that 
each state reserve a minimum of twenty-five percent of the state’s al-
lowances for “consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose[s].”110 De-
pending on the market for allowances, this requirement could leave 
states with millions of dollars pouring into an open-ended fund. Con-
sumer benefits could range from using the money to actually supple-
ment consumer electricity bills, to funding state-run energy efficiency 
programs, to placing the money back into the state coffers.111 
 Power producers lobbied states to auction only the twenty-five per-
cent minimum and to allocate the remaining shares to power produc-
                                                                                                                      
106 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding 1 (Dec. 20, 
2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf. 
107 Id. at 2. 
108 Edna Sussman, New York Addresses Climate Change with the First Mandatory Greenhouse 
Gas Program, N.Y. State Bar J., May 2006, at 43, available at 78-MAY N.Y. St. B.J. 43 (West-
law). 
109 Heddy Bolster, Note, The Commerce Clause Meets Environmental Protection: The Compen-
satory Tax Doctrine as a Defense of Potential Regional Carbon Dioxide Regulation, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 
737, 744 (2006) (citing the RGGI MOU). 
110 Model Rule § 5.3(a) (Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2007), available at http:// 
www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf. 
111 Press Release, Env’t Ne., RGGI Consumer Benefit Allocation (Aug. 1, 2006), avail-
able at http://ct.gov/dep/lib/dep/air/climatechange/energgiconsumerallo080106.pdf. 
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ers based on their historical or future energy production levels, without 
charging for these allocations.112 It is unprecedented in U.S. environ-
mental regulation that the allocations for emissions are auctioned to 
pre-existing, operating emission sources.113 Forcing power producers to 
pay for all of their allowances for pre-existing emissions could also cre-
ate a competitive disadvantage for in-state producers, if neighboring 
RGGI states’ generators are given allowances without charge or do not 
regulate GHGs from power plants. Power producers also expressed 
their concerns regarding how this new expense will affect their long-
term power contracts.114 The cost of future CO2 allowances was not fac-
tored into any of these existing contracts; generators producing under 
these long-term deals fear that they will not be able to adjust the con-
tract price to account for such costs.115 Whether the contract allows 
pass-through price adjustments will depend on the individual contract. 
 To date, a number of states have issued proposed state rules and 
intend to auction allowances, including New York and Vermont.116 Both 
the New York117 and Vermont118 rules outline procedures for allocating 
                                                                                                                      
112 One power producer, National Grid, has advocated auctioning 100% of the allow-
ances and then having the state use the money to supplement consumer rates. These gen-
erators propose that the costs spent on allowances by the utilities will be passed along to 
the consumer, resulting in higher retail prices for consumers. Nat’l Grid, Reg’l Green-
house Gas Initiative, NHDES Stakeholders Meeting (Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.des.state. 
nh.us/ard/climatechange/docs/NationalGrid.ppt. 
113 Roman Kramarchuk, All-Out Auctions?, Envtl. Fin., Mar. 2007, at 45, available at 
http://www.environmentalmarkets.org/galleries/default-file/Kramarchuk%20ef3market 
view_p45.pdf (noting that EPA auctions only one percent of total sulfur dioxide (SO2) allow-
ances and that this percentage does not include any auction to preexisting sources, which are 
freely allocated to electric power generators). 
114 Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Draft Meeting Summary: of Regional Stakeholder 
Meeting (May 2, 2006), http://www.rggi.org/docs/stakeholder_meeting_summary_5-2-06. 
pdf. 
115 Id. 
116 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 255 (2007); Express Terms, Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading 
Program pt. 242 (Dec. 5, 2006), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/air_pdf/part242draft.pdf; see 
Air Pollution Control Division, Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation, 
Proposed RGGI Regulations, http://www.anr.state.vt.us/air/htm/ProposedAmendments. 
htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008); Notice of Pre-Proposal of New York RGGI Rule—NYS 
Dept. of Environmental Conservation, http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/26450.html (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2008). Vermont receives the majority of its power from Vermont Yankee 
nuclear power plant and Hyrdo-Quebec, two power producers with very low carbon out-
put. Since Vermont will still have a significant amount of allowances allotted to it, the State 
could sell the allowances to out-of-state power producers. The Vermont proposed rule 
indicates that 100% of the CO2 allowances in the State will be allocated to a consumer 
benefit or strategic purpose set-aside account. See Air Pollution Control Division, supra. 
117 Notice of Pre-Proposal of New York RGGI Rule, supra note 116. The proceeds from 
this auction will then be used for “energy efficiency and clean energy technology purposes 
. . . the promotion of energy efficiency measures, promotion of renewable or non-carbon-
emitting energy technologies, and stimulation or reward of investment in the development 
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100% of CO2 emission allowances. In theory, existing electric power 
plants emitting carbon during their operations may or may not be suc-
cessful bidders for the allowances necessary to continue operations. 
3. The West’s Approach to Carbon Regulation 
 The California scheme is different than RGGI. It requires that 
California reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, considering 
all in-state and out-of-state generation used to serve California’s electric 
load.119 The program goes into effect in 2012.120 The California Air Re-
sources Board is authorized, but not required, to establish and enforce 
a market-based compliance system, which could include credits and 
banking.121 The compliance requirement falls on load-serving retail 
sellers of power, whereas RGGI places the compliance burden on the 
generators of power. With the restructuring of power resources,122 a 
portion of power is not retailed by the power generator.123 These regu-
latory distinctions are critical. 
 The California scheme covers all load-serving entities (LSEs), in-
cluding municipal LSEs.124 Electric generators are required to meet a 
CO2 emissions level no greater than that achievable by a combined-
                                                                                                                      
of innovative carbon emissions abatement technologies with significant carbon reduction 
potential.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This account will be managed by either the 
N.Y. Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) or an agent assigned by the DEC. 
Express Terms, Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program § 242-1.2(b)(12). 
118 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 255(c)(2). The account will be managed by trustees, ap-
pointed by the public service board, to provide the maximum long-term benefit to Ver-
mont electric consumers. Id. § 255(d). 
119 See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Cal. Health & Safety Code 
§§ 38,500–38,599 (West Supp. 2007). The Act sets a firm limit on GHG emissions in Cali-
fornia by requiring the Air Resources Board to determine California’s GHG emission level 
in 1990, and then issue regulations causing GHG emissions to be reduced to that level by 
2020. Id. §§ 38,550–38,551. The Act also requires comprehensive GHG reporting by major 
sources of GHG emissions. Id. § 38,530. Market-based compliance mechanisms are also 
discussed in the legislation, but left to the discretion of the Air Resources Board. See id. 
§§ 38,570–38,571, 38,574. While this approach regulates all significant sources of GHGs, 
because electric power production accounts for about twenty percent of California’s emis-
sions of GHGs, electric generation has become the primary target for regulation. See id. 
§ 38,501. In contrast, RGGI only regulates CO2, the electric power sector, and then only 
part of that sector. 
120 Id. § 38,562(a). 
121 Id. §§ 38,570–38,571, 38,574. 
122 See Steven Ferrey, The New Rules: A Guide to Electric Market Regulation 
135–60 (2000). 
123 Energy Information Administration, California Electricity Profile, 2006 Edition, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/california.html (last visited Apr. 30, 
2008). Approximately ten percent of retail electricity sales in California in 2006 were de-
regulated sales. See id. 
124 See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 380 (West 2007). 
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cycle natural gas generator.125 Any new contracts for a term of five years 
or more for the procurement of baseload generation must comply with 
a CO2 emissions performance standard of no more than 1100 lbs. of 
CO2/MWh.126 Baseload generation is defined as generation that is de-
signed and intended to operate an at annualized capacity factor of sixty 
percent or greater.127 
 The primary impact of this scheme will be to restrict the attrac-
tiveness of coal-fired generation for California. While California has 
little in-state coal generation, various California LSEs, particularly the 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, rely on coal-fired power 
for a significant amount of electricity.128 This restriction will have a sig-
nificant impact, especially with supplies very tight. California peak load 
growth was 38% between its last energy crisis in 2001 and 2006, an as-
tounding increase in peak demand of more than 6% annually.129 
 California’s carbon regulation system differs from RGGI in that 
the carbon compliance obligation of the former is placed on LSEs, 
rather than on the generators of power.130 This distinction between the 
two programs dictates whether regulation covers the generator of the 
power or the ultimate distributor of the power. LSEs are distributors of 
retail power, such as utilities or retail suppliers.131 LSEs have an entire 
                                                                                                                      
125 S. 1368, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (codified at Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8340). 
This legislation only targets electric generation. Id. Senate Bill 1368 governs all new long-
term energy commitments and establishes a “greenhouse gas emissions performance stan-
dard.” Id. This standard is specific to the electric power role in meeting Assembly Bill 32 
goals. The GHG emissions standard creates a specific level of permissible emissions and pro-
hibits new construction, new long-term power contracts, and any major plant investment that 
will not meet the performance standard. Id. This standard prohibits load-serving entities 
from entering long-term power contracts with out-of-state producers who do not meet Cali-
fornia’s stringent new emissions standard. California’s Public Utilities Commission (PUC) 
has set the GHG emissions performance standard at the equivalent of the emissions from a 
combined cycle natural gas plant. Id. 
126 Seth Hilton, The Impact of California’s Global Warming Legislation on the Electric Utility 
Industry, 19 Electricity J. 10, 12–13 (2006). This is a level that conventional coal-fired 
electric generation will not be able to meet. Id. at 14. 
127 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8340(a). 
128 Hilton, supra note 126, at 13. The three major investor-owned utilities import 3% to 
15% of their total supply in the form of out-of-state coal-fired power. The Los Angeles De-
partment of Water and Power imports half of its power from these sources. Id. 
129 See Historic Statewide California Electricity Demand, http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
electricity/historic_peak_demand.html (last visited May 13, 2008). 
130 See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8340(h); Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative(RGGI)—
About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). The RGGI sys-
tem governs only the original power producers, whereas the California bill governs any 
load serving entity, defined as “every electrical corporation, electric service provider, or 
community choice aggregator serving end-use customers in the state.” See Cal. Pub. Util. 
Code § 8340(h). 
131 See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8340(h). 
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portfolio of power generation resources that they can optimize for pur-
poses of GHG compliance. LSEs can continue to purchase carbon-rich 
generation, and compensate with adding renewable energy resources 
or other low-carbon generation, to meet the requirement averaged 
over the entire resource portfolio. 
 By contrast, the RGGI scheme requires each generator facility to 
comply individually, penalizes each high-carbon generating resource, 
and does not allow any optimization among portfolios of generation.132 
In RGGI, each individual generator is responsible for compliance at 
each facility. Renewable energy projects sited outside the RGGI area do 
not qualify for RGGI compliance.133 RGGI only regulates CO2, the elec-
tric power sector, and larger units that are part of that sector. RGGI al-
lows steep fines for those with insufficient allowances,134 but does not 
criminalize these failures as does California.135 
 In the West, California regulates all carbon. It also has a different 
approach than RGGI. California regulates more than just CO2, and 
more than just utility sources.136 It regulates load-serving entities, in-
cludes municipal utilities, and requires that electric resource procure-
ment for electric generation emit less than 1100 lbs. of CO2/MWh.137 A 
variety of fossil units will not meet this standard. Yet the California 
scheme has exceptions and loopholes that will encourage some gaming 
of the system.138 
                                                                                                                      
132 See Model Rule §§ XX-1.2(av)-(aw), XX-1.5(f)(2) (Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf. 
133 Id. § XX-6.5(d)(2)(i). 
134 See id. § XX-1.5(d)(2); Caiteur Group Inc. & Caiteur Group Climate Change Insti-
tute, Comment on Draft of Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule (May 18, 
2006), http://www.rggi.org/docs/caiteur.pdf. 
135 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Cal. Health & Safety Code 
§ 38,580 (West Supp. 2007). 
136 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38,505(g), 38,530(b)(2). The Act sets a goal of 
achieving 1990 carbon emissions levels by 2020. Id. § 38,550. Also, the Western Climate Initia-
tive involves California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, and New Mexico in a common effort. 
Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last visited Apr. 30, 
2008). 
137 See Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38,530(b)(2); SB 1368—Emission Performance 
Standards, http://www.energy.ca.gov/emission_standards/index.html (last visited Apr. 30, 
2008). 
138 These loopholes involve a prohibition on high-carbon power import contracts of 
five years or greater. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8341(b)(4) (West 2007). This prohibition will 
encourage 4.9 year contracts. Some of the carbon limitations also apply only to baseload 
electric generation resources. Id. § 8341(a). There will be recharacterization of the nature 
of generation resources. 
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4. Carbon Regulation and the U.S. Constitution 
 The constitutional issues plaguing RGGI include a claim that the 
agreement and the means of its implementation may violate the Su-
premacy Clause of the Constitution, and perhaps the Compact 
Clause.139 In order for RGGI to work effectively at reducing carbon emis-
sions, rather than increasing the importation of high-carbon power, 
states are actively considering surcharging or taxing wholesale power 
leaking from outside the region; this penalty could constitute a violation 
of the Commerce Clause.140 Moreover, in certain states, the RGGI 
scheme may also constitute an unauthorized tax. 
 Efforts to control so-called leakage of non-carbon regulated power 
into the RGGI states from outside the region will lead to significant 
Commerce Clause challenges for these regimes. Leakage describes the 
possibility that “generators outside the capped region could export 
power load-serving entities within the region without being covered by 
the regional carbon cap.”141 This threat to the goals of regional carbon 
control initiatives is very real. In trying, through RGGI regulation, to 
decrease the amount of CO2 emissions by fifty-five million tons over the 
period from 2009 to 2018, an increase of unregulated power imports 
from uncapped coal-fired plants in states such as Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania of even 1.5% to 2.0% would eliminate all scheduled emissions 
reductions from regulated generators within the regulated region.142 
 To stem this inflow, the RGGI states are now discussing implemen-
tation of some type of control, regulation, or tax to discourage cheaper 
power imports from unregulated states external to the RGGI region.143 
Such controls on the free flow of electricity from other states, a com-
modity or service that is a quintessential article in interstate com-
merce,144 may violate the dormant Commerce Clause. This limitation 
                                                                                                                      
139 See Claire Carothers, Note, United We Stand: The Interstate Compact as a Tool for Effecting 
Climate Change, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 229, 236 (2006) ( “[A] regional plan or compact regulating 
emission controls would likely be found as encroaching upon areas typically delegated to the 
federal government, as well as potentially increasing the powers of the participating states.”). 
140 Bolster, supra note 109, at 737. 
141 Richard Cowart, Regulatory Assistance Project, Addressing Leakage in a Cap-and-
Trade System: Treating Imports as Sources 1 (Apr. 2006), http://www.raponline.org/ 
Pubs/RC-leakage-4-06.pdf. 
142 See id. at 3. 
143 See Bolster, supra note 109, at 745 (“The resulting increase in cheaper, imported 
electricity will undermine the goal of the program because imported emissions will not 
count towards the region’s emission limits even though they are directly associated with 
the region’s electricity consumption.”). 
144 See Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: Thermodynamics, Mass, 
and Energy, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1839, 1908 (2004) [hereinafter Ferrey, Inverting Choice 
of Law]. 
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creates problems in trying to track power, which is not so much a 
commodity as a particular power service.145 Such regulation by the 
RGGI states will need to target power flows based on their state of 
power generation origin, distinguishing between those from RGGI 
states and non-RGGI states. 
 Concern about leakage is real. There are multi-billion dollar pro-
jects to build electric transmission infrastructure that would allow elec-
tricity generated by high emission, coal-fired power plants to travel east 
into the RGGI region.146 RGGI states such as New Jersey, New York, 
Maryland, and Delaware are bordered by states that are not signatories 
to RGGI and have historically produced a large volume of electricity 
from coal-fired power plants.147 Similarly, California imports power 
from eleven states, including a large amount of coal-fired power.148 
 Wholesale electricity is moving in interstate commerce at the speed 
of light.149 Leakage of less-costly power, whose carbon content is not 
regulated or affected, leaping state boundaries from Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Indiana, and other non-RGGI states into the RGGI zone, is going 
to be restricted.150 Because the states are attempting to not only regulate 
carbon produced within their borders, but also create carbon-regulated 
islands into which externally produced wholesale power can no longer 
enter freely without penalty, such point-of-origin regulation will create 
significant dormant Commerce Clause issues.151 
 Second, the decision of most of these states to maximize associated 
revenues by auctioning all their newly created allocations for power 
plants to emit carbon triggers Supremacy Clause concerns. In RGGI, 
                                                                                                                      
145 Id. at 1882. 
146 See generally Edison Elec. Inst., Transmission Projects: At a Glance (2008), 
http://www.eei.org/industry_issues/energy_infrastructure/transmission/Trans_Project_l
owres.pdf (describing numerous utility regions throughout the United States). 
147 RGGI Emissions Multi-State Staff Working Group, Reg’l Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, Potential Emissions Leakage and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (RGGI): Evaluating Market Dynamics, Monitoring Options, and Possible 
Mitigation Mechanisms, at ES-1 (2007), http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_ 
3_14_07.pdf [hereinafter Multi-State Working Group]. 
148 Id. RGGI states, such as New Jersey, New York, Maryland and Delaware, are bor-
dered by states that are not signatories to RGGI, and historically have produced a large 
volume of electricity from coal-fired power plants. Similarly, California imports power from 
eleven states, including a large amount of coal-fired power. See 2006 Gross System Electric-
ity Production, http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/gross_system_power.html (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2008) (showing that California imports approximately ten percent of its total elec-
tricity from out-of-state coal plants). 
149 See Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law, supra note 144, at 1910. 
150 Multi-State Working Group, supra note 147, at ES-1. 
151 See Ferrey, Examples & Explanations, supra note 50, at 140–49. 
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only larger electric power generators are regulated.152 RGGI states are 
moving to a 100% auction versus free allocation of CO2 emissions allo-
cations.153 This approach is contrary to how other pollution emission 
allocations have been handled over the history of air regulation in the 
United States.154 This auction scheme will lead to constitutional chal-
lenges from those regulated, with a reasonable chance of success. The 
purpose of state auctions is to increase the price for certain high-
emitting carbon power plant operations—coal in particular—as a way 
to change the dispatch order under which plants are operated by the 
independent system operator.155 This auction scheme thus potentially 
crosses the line—individually or collectively—between what states are 
and are not allowed to regulate. Finally, there are constitutional issues 
with the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution, raised by the carbon 
compact binding the ten eastern states.156 
 Even if the RGGI scheme survives constitutional and other legal 
challenge, it has other idiosyncrasies. Offsets are limited to a small per-
centage of compliance options.157 MOUs to move offsets into the RGGI 
region from projects undertaken outside RGGI borders could prove 
cumbersome.158 East does not meet West. The RGGI scheme does not 
match up with the California regulation, or Kyoto. These differences 
create tremendous uncertainty in the carbon markets. 
B. Litigation 
 The second element is the evolution of the common law as a driv-
ing force on corporate decisionmaking. A new wave of litigation focuses 
on carbon. All corporations have general counsel who are concerned 
about liability, risk, and exposure. Very recently, the color of such expo-
sure has turned green and is denominated in carbon-equivalent units. 
                                                                                                                      
152 See Multi-State Working Group, supra note 147, at ES-3. Only facilities greater 
than twenty-five megawatts are regulated by RGGI. Id. 
153 See Notice of Pre-Proposal of New York RGGI Rule, supra note 116. 
154 See Ferrey, Law of Independent Power, supra note 28, §§ 6:78, :81–:82, :93. 
155 See Notice of Pre-Proposal of New York RGGI Rule, supra note 116; Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, “Very High Emissions” Scenario: Plausibility of Modeled Out-
comes 1 (Nov. 15, 2005), http://www.rggi.org/doc/vhe_scenario_11_15_05.pdf. 
156 Carothers, supra note 139, at 236. 
157 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative—
Overview 4 (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_rggi_overview_12_20_05.pdf. 
158 See Edison Electric Institute Comments on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
Memorandum of Understanding 11–12 (Mar. 20, 2006), http://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi-
eeimou_comments032006final.pdf. 
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1. At the U.S. Supreme Court 
 Litigation and liability risk are now, for the first time, comprised of 
carbon issues. These risks are extensive and accelerating. In the recent 
Supreme Court case of Massachusetts v. EPA, a suit was filed by twelve 
states and several cities against the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to force it to regulate CO2 and GHGs.159 The Court held 
that EPA has authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to regulate GHG 
emissions from new motor vehicles, and that even indirect harm from 
climate change can confer standing to sue EPA for failure to comply 
with CAA mandates.160 Notably, the Court did not hold that GHG emis-
sions from stationary sources such as power plants are regulated by the 
CAA, that auto companies are liable for the harm caused by GHG emis-
sions, or that EPA is required to regulate GHG emissions from mobile 
sources.161 
 The decision was a closely divided five to four.162 The impact of this 
case on climate change issues is more psychological when it comes to 
forcing immediate carbon regulation, although it has affected standing 
issues for NGO litigation on environmental, particularly carbon, is-
sues.163 This Supreme Court decision has the psychological impact of 
creating a certain consciousness about carbon and the role of litigation 
to mitigate the impacts of carbon emissions. This psychological factor is 
extremely important. There is now tremendous momentum behind 
carbon litigation and regulation. 
                                                                                                                      
159 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007). On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Su-
preme Court issued an opinion reversing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 
Id. at 1463. The Court held that: (1) Massachusetts had standing to petition for review; (2) 
EPA has statutory authority under the Clean Air Act to regulateGHG emissions; and (3) 
EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the petition on grounds outside those 
delineated in the Clean Air Act. Id. at 1458, 1459–60, 1463. 
160 Id. at 1457, 1459. Shortly after EPA’s denial in 2003 of a 1999 petition asking that it 
regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles, several states and environmental groups 
petitioned the D.C. Circuit, requesting review of EPA’s decision. Id. at 1450–51. In 2005, 
the court panel held that the EPA Administrator acted lawfully in exercising his discretion 
to deny the original petition. Id. at 1451. 
161 See id. at 1463. EPA is not forced to regulate these emissions, but it may only avoid 
doing so if it determines that these emissions do not contribute to climate change or if it 
provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot, or will not, exercise its discre-
tion to do so. See id. For example, EPA would have to provide justification as to why GHG 
emissions do not cause or contribute to global warming, which the majority interprets to 
be encompassed within air pollution. See id. 
162 Id. at 1444. 
163 Even if EPA were to immediately move to try to regulate carbon under this deci-
sion, the history of EPA rulemaking and subsequent challenge for other pollutants under 
the Clean Air Act suggests that one would not expect to see an enforced carbon regulation 
for at least a decade. 
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 A second, but very important, impact of the Massachusetts v. EPA 
decision is to lower the standard for demonstrating causation and re-
dressability for environmental standing.164 The Court found that al-
though the effects of global warming are “widely shared,” Massachu-
setts had standing because Massachusetts could show some modicum of 
harm, thereby rejecting EPA’s argument that global warming’s wide-
spread effects negated standing for any particular individual plaintiff.165 
The Court found that because Massachusetts owned or had interests in 
significant land that would allegedly be affected by global warming, it 
showed the requisite particularized harm.166 The reduction of new ve-
hicle emissions was significant enough to affect global warming, given 
that the transportation sector alone contributed close to one-third of 
the GHGs emitted in the United States.167 The Court explained that 
while regulating motor vehicle emissions may not itself reverse global 
warming, redressability requirements were met where regulation would 
impact the emission of global warming gases.168 The Court noted that 
while the risk of catastrophic harm was remote, it was nevertheless real, 
and could be reduced if relief were afforded.169 
 The additional prudential factors that the Supreme Court has 
been adding in a string of decisions170 since the 1990 opinion in Lujan 
v. National Wildlife Federation171 have been turned back. There is now 
standing of certain state governments or groups asserting extremely 
indirect damages from global warming gas production.172 The Massa-
chusetts v. EPA holding makes certain that public plaintiffs have a lesser 
burden to demonstrate standing, and imposes a lower requirement to 
demonstrate that granting the relief sought would redress the asserted 
harm. Especially with global pollutants, such as CO2, this causal link is 
difficult to demonstrate because of the indirect relationship between 
                                                                                                                      
164 See 127 S. Ct. at 1457–58; Ferrey, Examples & Explanations, supra note 50, at 48–
53. 
165 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1456. 
166 Id. Massachusetts owns, operates, and maintains fifty-three coastal parks and numer-
ous coastal recreational facilities with significant infrastructure, combined with roads, walk-
ways, sea walls, pump stations, and piers, as such petitioners were able to allege damages from 
global warming could run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Id. at 1456 & n.19. 
167 Id. at 1457–58. 
168 See id. at 1458 (stating that because other countries such as China and India are 
poised to increase GHG emissions does not mean a reduction in the United States would 
have no effect). 
169 See id. (holding that risks to Massachusetts are real and reducible to some extent if 
given the relief sought). 
170 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
171 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
172 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1438. 
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CO2 emissions and measurable local impacts, so the holding makes 
bringing suit possible. 
2. In the Lower Courts 
 The status of climate change litigation in the United States was 
such that no stakeholder was immune even before this recent Supreme 
Court decision. Several types of defendants were facing litigation before 
the decision. In point of fact, everyone was the target of carbon litiga-
tion long before Massachusetts v. EPA. 
 Federal governmental regulators were the target of suit in Korsinsky 
v. EPA, a 2005 case before the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.173 A complaint was filed by a New York resident who 
claimed that global warming was a public nuisance under federal com-
mon law and New York statutory and/or common law.174 In Korsinsky, a 
pro se plaintiff alleged that global warming would physically injure him 
over time, causing him to suffer sinus-related diseases enhanced by the 
risk of contaminated drinking water resulting from increased floods.175 
The plaintiff claimed that he “developed a mental sickness” because he 
was so worried about what might happen to him because of global 
warming.176 As relief, the plaintiff requested that the defendants be 
held jointly and severally liable and, also, that the court require the de-
fendants to implement his invention.177 
 The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on the ground that he 
lacked standing.178 The plaintiff’s physical injury did not rise to the 
level of a “certainly impending” injury required for Article III standing 
and his alleged mental injury was not specific enough, nor would im-
plementing the plaintiff’s invention redress the harm of global warm-
ing.179 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, hold-
ing that the plaintiff had not established standing because he had not 
explained exactly what possible injury had been caused by the appel-
lants’ actions, nor did he show how the injury could be redressed, and 
                                                                                                                      
173 Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 859 (NRB), 2005 WL 2414744, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
29, 2005). 
174 Id. 
175 See id. at *2. 
176 See id. (internal quotations omitted). 
177 See id. at *1. 
178 See id. at *2–3. 
179 See Korsinsky, at *2–3 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 
(1992)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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therefore, the court could not grant jurisdiction.180 As a pro se plaintiff, 
Korsinsky’s complaint enjoyed a lower level of scrutiny from the court. 
 Coke Oven Environmental Task Force v. EPA,181 and its later proceed-
ing New York v. EPA,182 both cases tried in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, involved claims filed against federal permitting agen-
cies. In Coke Oven, at issue was a petition for review challenging EPA’s 
decision not to regulate CO2 emissions for the purposes of global cli-
mate change.183 The case was stayed pending the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Massachusetts v. EPA.184 
 State or local government permitting agencies were targeted in the 
recent case in San Bernardino Superior Court of Center for Biological 
Diversity v. San Bernardino County.185 Two environmental citizen groups 
filed a lawsuit against San Bernardino County, alleging violations of the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), attributable to the 
County’s failure to address the impacts of its long-term land-use plan-
ning document on climate change, global warming, and GHG emis-
sions. The groups asserted that the County ignored requests from the 
California Attorney General and various conservation groups to assess 
climate change issues in the development of the plan and the CEQA 
process. 
 California sued companies that made products that burned fossil 
fuels in California v. General Motors Corp., in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California.186 The State of California filed suit 
                                                                                                                      
180 See Korsinsky v. EPA, 192 F. App’x 71, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that to es-
tablish standing a plaintiff must show that the injury is “‘actual’ or ‘imminent,’ rather than 
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560)). 
181 Coke Oven Envtl. Task Force v. EPA, No. 06-1131, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23499, at 
*1–4 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 2006) (per curium). A number of environmental groups, states, 
and cities originally petitioned the EPA to enact standards regulating GHG emissions for 
new stationary sources. Id. 
182 New York v. EPA, No. 06-1148, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 30013 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 26, 
2007) (per curium). 
183 See 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23499, at *1–4. 
184 The court issued a per curiam order holding the matter in abeyance pending the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. Id. at *4. 
185 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. San Bernardino County, No. 07–00295 (San Bernardino 
Super. Ct. filed Apr. 11, 2007); Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Attorney General 
Challenges San Bernardino County General Plan: Joins Conservationists in Global Warming 
Concerns (Apr. 13, 2007), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/san- 
bernardino-04-13-2007.html. 
186 California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, 
at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). The State of California filed suit against six automobile 
manufacturers—General Motors Corporation; Toyota Motor North America, Inc.; Ford 
Motor Company; Honda North America, Inc.; Chrysler Motors Corporation; and Nissan 
North America Inc.—under both the federal and California common law of public nui-
sance, requesting compensation for damages allegedly inflicted by their vehicles’ GHG 
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against six automobile manufacturers requesting compensation for 
damage inflicted by their vehicles’ GHG emissions. In 2004, the CO2 
emissions from personal vehicles totaled 314 million metric tons.187 
Although Americans own 30% of the world’s cars, these cars account 
for 45% of the entire global CO2 emissions attributable to vehicles.188 
 This suit was dismissed under the political question doctrine in 
September 2007.189 The plaintiff requested that the defendant auto-
makers be held “jointly and severally liable for creating, contributing 
to, and maintaining a public nuisance,” and requested monetary dam-
ages for future damages and expenses incurred by the State of Califor-
nia in connection with global warming.190 The plaintiff further asserted 
that it should not have to wait for Congress to mandate a comprehen-
sive solution to global warming because such a solution was unneces-
sary for tort liability under federal common law.191 
 Similar to the decision in Connecticut v. American Electric Power, dis-
cussed infra, the court in General Motors held that the plaintiff lacked 
standing because the issue was nonjusticiable.192 In contrasting General 
Motors with American Electric Power, the court explained that deciding the 
claims would force the court to balance competing policy interests, 
which is the type of decision that should be made by elected political 
branches, rather than the courts.193 Unlike American Electric Power, this 
case was decided after the Supreme Court opinion in Massachusetts v. 
EPA. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to make the leap from Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA, where a state waived its sovereign immunity to chal-
lenge a rejected rule making through administrative procedures, to the 
empowerment of a state claiming interstate tort damages from global 
warming.194 Citing a veritable logistical nightmare, the court stated: 
                                                                                                                      
emissions, as well as a declaratory judgment that the manufacturers would be held liable 
for any further damages caused by climate change. See id. at *1–2, *4. California asserted 
that the vehicles the defendants manufactured accounted for thirty percent of California’s 
emissions, and that such emissions—a public nuisance—harmed the coastline, water sup-
ply, and treasury of California. See id. at *3–4. The automobile manufacturers defended on 
the grounds that: (1) the case raised nonjusticiable political questions, meaning that this 
was the type of issue for the legislative and executive branches, not the judiciary, to decide; 
and (2) federal legislation has displaced federal common law on this topic. Id. at *5, *49. 
187 See Tallying Greenhouse Gases from Cars, Global Warming, Environmental Defense 
Fund, http://www.edf.org/article.cfm?contentID=5300 (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
188 Id. 
189 Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *38, *51. 
190 See id. at *4. 
191 See id. at *19. 
192 See id. at *35, *37–38. 
193 Id. at *23–24. 
194 See id. at *36–37 (distinguishing Gen. Motors. Corp. from Massachusetts v. EPA). 
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Plaintiff’s global warning [sic] nuisance tort claim seeks to 
impose damages on a much larger and unprecedented scale 
by grounding the claim in pollution originating both within, 
and well beyond, the borders of the State of California. 
Unlike the equitable standards available in Plaintiffs cited 
cases, here the Court is left without a manageable method of 
discerning the entities that are creating and contributing to 
the alleged nuisance. In this case, there are multiple world-
wide sources of atmospheric warming across myriad industries 
and multiple countries.195 
 Large industrial CO2 emitters were the target of litigation in North-
west Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Corning Corp., in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Oregon.196 Three environmental groups 
filed a complaint alleging Owens Corning was constructing a manufac-
turing facility that would emit 250 tons of greenhouse, and ozone de-
pleting, emissions without obtaining a required Air Contaminant Dis-
charge Permit.197 
 Several state attorneys general sued utility companies that emitted 
GHGs in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.198 The State of Con-
necticut and others filed suit against five utility companies under fed-
eral common law and/or statutory common law of the states alleging 
the tort of public nuisance stemming from global warming issues.199 
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants annually emitted 650 million 
tons of CO2, amounting to one-quarter of the electric power sector’s 
CO2—America’s electric power sector is responsible for ten percent of 
                                                                                                                      
195 See Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *47–48. 
196 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957, 957, 959–60 (D. 
Or. 2006). 
197 Id. at 959–60. On July 8, 2005, Owens Corning filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the 
court denied in full on June 6, 2006. On June 8, 2006, the parties executed a Stipulated 
Order of Dismissal, which was incorporated into the court’s judgment and order on June 
8, 2006. Id. 
198 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
Plaintiffs were the states of Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin; New York City; the Open Space Institute, Inc.; the Open 
Space Conservancy, Inc.; and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire. Id. Defendants 
were six major power companies: American Electric Power Corp., American Electric Power 
Service, The Southern Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy Inc., and 
Cinergy Corp. Id. Plaintiffs claimed that U.S. electric power plants were responsible for ten 
percent of all man-made GHG emissions worldwide, that these emissions were causing 
climate change, and that this climate change was harming their sovereign interests as well 
as those of their citizens. See id. at 268. For example, they assert potential property loss 
through rising sea levels and public health injuries based on stronger summer heat waves. 
See id. 
199 Id. at 267. 
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worldwide man-made CO2 emissions.200 The plaintiffs requested equi-
table relief, asking that the defendants be held “jointly and severally 
liable for contributing to an ongoing public nuisance” of global warm-
ing, and be enjoined to cap their emissions of CO2 and then to de-
crease emissions by a specified percentage each year.201 
 The defendants in turn filed a motion to dismiss on several 
grounds.202 The court granted the defendants’ motion, calling the is-
sues in the case nonjusticiable political questions.203 The court held 
that it needed to strike a balance between the interests of those who 
were seeking to reduce pollution against the hindering of economic 
development.204 The court determined that this balance would be im-
possible without an initial policy determination from Congress and the 
President.205 This case was dismissed two years prior to the Supreme 
Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. The matter is now on appeal.206 
 Insurers were defendants in the case of Comer v. Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co. (the Hurricane Katrina Litigation) in the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.207 A class action com-
plaint for damages and declaratory relief against several insurance com-
panies and oil companies was filed, alleging claims of insurance cover-
age issues and global warming issues, based in part on the defendants’ 
emissions, which were alleged to have enabled Hurricane Katrina to de-
                                                                                                                      
200 Id. at 268. 
201 Id. at 270 (internal quotations omitted). 
202 Id. The court stated: Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted because: (1) there is no recognized federal common law 
cause of action to abate greenhouse gas emissions that allegedly contribute to global 
warming; (2) separation of powers principles preclude this Court from adjudicating these 
actions; and (3) Congress has displaced any federal common law cause of action to address 
the issue of global warming. Second, Defendants contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction 
over Plaintiffs’ claims because: (1) Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue on account of 
global warming and (2) Plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim under federal law divests the 
Court of § 1331 jurisdiction. 
Id. 
203 Id. at 274. 
204 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272. 
205 Id. at 272–73 (defining political questions that the court would be forced to an-
swer). 
206 The case was appealed on September 22, 2005, and oral arguments on briefs were 
held on June 7, 2006 before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. To date, a 
decision is pending by the Second Circuit. Connecticut v. American Electric Power Com-
pany—Endangered Environmental Laws, http://www.endangeredlaws.org/case_connecticut. 
htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
207 Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:05 CV 436 LTD RHW, 2006 WL 1066645, 
at *1 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006). 
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velop unprecedented strength and, as a result, allowed the class to suffer 
a common set of damages.208 
 Even U.S. financial institutions have been carbon litigation defen-
dants.209 In Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, the plaintiff alleged that the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Export-
Import Bank (Ex-Im) failed to comply with NEPA, and that global 
warming was caused by GHG emissions that resulted from the failure of 
OPIC and Ex-Im to comply with NEPA when providing assistance to 
fossil fuel projects worldwide.210 Ex-Im provides financial support for 
U.S. exports.211 Ex-Im has adopted its own environmental review pro-
cedure for large and long-term loans or guarantees, although ultimate 
funding discretion lies with the Board of Directors.212 Ex-Im and OPIC 
track and report aggregate GHG emissions from their respective pro-
jects.213 
 The plaintiffs identified seven projects funded by OPIC and Ex-Im, 
asserting that they should have prepared NEPA EISs.214 The plaintiffs 
claimed that under NEPA both agencies were required to prepare an 
environmental assessment, at a bare minimum, as a prerequisite to 
lending.215 The plantiffs argued that, while OPIC’s handbook required 
a review of whether OPIC credit support would violate any OPIC re-
quirement, this review did not conform to a NEPA review.216 The court 
                                                                                                                      
208 See id. *1–2. The court dismissed the class action suit against the insurance company 
defendants in early 2006. See id. at *4–5. 
209 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 891 (N.D. Cal. 
2007). 
210 Id. at 892. Pursuant to NEPA requirements, Friends of the Earth claimed that both 
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change. See id. 
211 Id. at 895. 
212 See id. at 895–96. 
213 Id. at 895, 897. 
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215 See Friends of the Earth, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 897, 910. Particularly, plaintiffs claimed 
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216 See id. at 893–95; Ferrey with Cabraal, supra note 12, at 311–34. The OPIC 
handbook provides in relevant part: 
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port for the project. OPIC cannot provide a final commitment to a project . . . 
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by OPIC that the environmental health and safety impacts of the project are 
acceptable. 
Friends of the Earth, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (second alteration in original) (citations omit-
ted). OPIC categorizes Category A projects as “likely to have significant adverse environ-
mental impacts that are sensitive (e.g. irreversible, affect sensitive ecosystems, involve in-
voluntary resettlement, etc.), diverse, or unprecedented.” Id. at 894. Category B projects 
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held that no programmatic EIS was required because the projects were 
too scattered geographically and the approval of one project did not 
guarantee the approval of subsequent or similar projects.217 
 Finally, the Inuit Petition to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, filed in December of 2005, claimed that CO2 emissions 
constituted a violation of fundamental human rights.218 In sum, even 
before the recent Supreme Court decision on carbon, every type of en-
tity was at litigation risk, a risk that is now growing. 
 It is true that several of these suits have been dismissed, some prior 
to the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, as nonjusti-
ciable, involving political questions, or for failure to state a claim.219 
However, some of these claims have survived or are on appeal.220 The 
first wave of litigation against institutions and companies often is not 
successful, with prospects evolving over time as the science progresses, 
documents are discovered, and public opinion changes. The Supreme 
Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, while surely not resulting in any 
immediate, judicially imposed carbon restrictions, has opened the doors 
more widely for judicial standing of parties to raise carbon-related 
                                                                                                                      
are “likely to have adverse environmental impacts that are less significant than those of 
Category A projects, meaning that few if any of the impacts are likely to be irreversible, 
that they are site-specific, and that mitigatory measures can be designed more readily than 
for Category A projects.” Id. 
217 Friends of the Earth, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 911–12 (concluding that neither defendant 
had the requisite “program”). Neither OPIC nor Ex-Im had “adopted ‘a group of con-
certed actions to implement a specific policy or plan’ nor engaged in ‘systematic and con-
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gram or executive directive.’” Id. at 911. 
218 See Martin Wagner & Donald M. Goldberg, An Inuit Petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights for Dangerous Impacts of Climate Change (Dec. 15, 2004), 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/COP10_Handout_EJCIEL.pdf. The Inuit claim that the 
failure of the United States to reduce GHG emissions and its refusal to adopt the Kyoto 
Protocol has resulted in climate change, causing human rights violations toward the Inuit 
people, including violations of their right to culture and property. See id. 
A petition was submitted on behalf of Sheila Watt-Cloutier and sixty-two other named 
individuals, all Inuit of the Arctic regions of the United States and Canada, claiming hu-
man rights violations resulting from the impacts of climate change. See id.; Ctr. for Int’l 
Envtl. L. (CEIL), Inuit File Petition with Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Claiming 
Global Warming Caused by United States Is Destroying Their Culture and Livelihoods, Dec. 7, 2005, 
http://www.ciel.org/Climate/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.html. The Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights refused to hear the Inuit Petition. Watt-Cloutier indicated that she 
would not give up the fight and asked the Commission for further information on why the 
petition was not going forward. 
219 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. CO6-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). 
220 See Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company—Endangered Environmental 
Laws, http://www.endangeredlaws.org/case_connecticut.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
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claims. While litigation is just beginning, it is possible that GHG emis-
sions could become the next tobacco, asbestos, or MTBE221 litigation. 
Conclusion: Corporate Action 
 Global climate change rapidly and recently took a prominent 
place in the world equation and among corporate citizens. The scien-
tific consensus is that carbon emissions must be drastically cut to pre-
vent dramatically altering the planet and human health. Though the 
United States did not adopt the Kyoto Protocol, steps are being taken, 
primarily at the state level, to regulate the country’s CO2 emissions. 
State-led initiatives such as RGGI are buttressed by court litigation go-
ing well beyond cases like Massachusetts v. EPA. The need to regulate 
carbon is now moving forward in about half the states. Exactly how 
corporations respond to new levels of regulation remains to be seen. 
What cannot be ignored is that GHG regulation is now an issue in the 
global consciousness and in business decisionmaking. 
 As carbon emerges an a new environmental meta-issue, what will 
be the physical and policy fix? Developed nations employ fire to ma-
nipulate the universe. This manipulation makes CO2 emissions the 
great bulk of the global warming challenge. About forty percent of U.S. 
carbon emissions contributing to climate change are attributed to coal-
fired power generation. This percentage can be reduced by focusing on 
how we produce and use energy, particularly in the corporate sector. 
Concrete actions by corporate America to mitigate GHG emissions are 
essential. Here, the dialogue has not changed in recent years. Con-
stants in the firmament of viable corporate options are those same re-
newable energy and energy efficiency solutions that were the founda-
tion of an intelligent response on the warming issue. In fact, these solu-
tions have not altered fundamentally since the energy crises of the 
1970s.222 Two strategies that have enjoyed widespread adoption by the 
states are the systems benefits charge and renewable portfolio standard. 
The carbon footprint of all would have been palpably reduced if only 
cost-effective renewable energy conservation and cogeneration imple-
mentation, recommended or set in motion then, had been adopted.223 
                                                                                                                      
221 Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE), US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/mtbe (last vis-
ited Apr. 30, 2008). 
222 See Steven Ferrey, Opinion, The Energy Problem: Now What?, Boston Globe, Oct. 16, 
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While improved, and in some cases lower in price,224 the basic techno-
logical fix has been relatively constant for a generation. These strategies 
are discussed extensively in the treatise I authored, The Law of Independ-
ent Power.225 
 When I spoke at the symposium on corporate environmental re-
sponsibility three years ago at the William and Mary School of Law, I 
noted that it was not that corporations were making incorrect deci-
sions, but that the incentives to operate with greater environmental 
consciousness had not been compelling.226 I noted then that states were 
taking the lead to provide a number of then-new, and extremely attrac-
tive, incentives to make green action more attractive. Today, those in-
centives at the state level have blossomed into a virtual cornucopia of 
opportunity, waiting to be realized.227 Rather than voluntary reduction, 
mandatory reductions will be painful to the economy. First, at current, 
not future, levels of demand for energy, the known world oil reserves 
will last approximately four decades, known natural gas reserves will last 
approximately seven decades, and known coal reserves will last slightly 
more than sixteen decades. Second, a report by the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers forecasts that a federal carbon cap-and-trade sys-
tem, similar to the Warner-Lieberman carbon regulation bill, by 2030 
will increase gasoline prices by 60% to 144%, increase electricity prices 
by 77% to 129%, increase natural gas prices by 84% to 146%, eliminate 
three to four million jobs, and reduce GDP by half a trillion dollars.228 
Duke Energy, a major U.S. power company, predicted that consumer 
retail electric bills would jump 50% due to the costs of compliance with 
the Warner-Lieberman U.S. carbon legislation.229 Fitch Ratings esti-
mated in 2006 that the initial phase of U.S. cap-and-trade CO2 emission 
reductions would cost electric utilities approximately $6.5 billion annu-
ally,230 which would be passed on to consumers. Creative solutions and 
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incentives must be implemented to stave off the negatives of carbon 
regulation. 
 The problem of carbon emissions has not abated: in 2007 the rise 
in carbon emissions from power plants in the United States was greater 
than in any year in the past decade.231 Economist Joseph Stiglitz has 
noted that there is a problem in incentivizing private corporations be-
cause “private incentives are often not aligned with social costs and 
benefits.”232 The technique of incentivizing the use of renewable energy 
should continue to be encouraged and is a way to increase corpora-
tions’ awareness that they too are carbon-based. 
                                                                                                                      
capped model, with carbon allowances trading at ten dollars per allowance. It also con-
cluded that thousands of megawatts of electric generation capacity would have to be re-
placed with zero-emission energy sources. See id. 
231 Leora Falk, Climate Change: Study Finds Rise in Carbon Emissions from Power Plants 
Largest Since 1998, 39 Env’t Rep. (BNA) No.12, at 552 (Mar. 21, 2008). 
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